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An Investigation of Failed Reforms

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**EDUCATIONAL STRATIFICATION IN ITALY:  
AN INVESTIGATION OF FAILED REFORMS.**

**ABSTRACT**

During the 1960s Italy reformed its educational system in several important respects. First, in 1963, the unified middle school was established and compulsory schooling was extended till age fourteen. Second, in 1961 and again in 1969 access to universities was greatly liberalized by enabling students in all upper-secondary tracks, including the *istituti professionali* -- attended primarily by the working classes -- to seat for the *maturità* examinations and to continue to university. The reform was expected to reduce class inequality in university attendance by raising the odds that working class youth would do so.

However, previous research (Cobalti and Schizzerotto 1993, 1994) finds little change in class inequalities in educational attainment. Using the same data employed by Cobalti and Schizzerotto (The data were collected in 1985 by Barbagli, Capecchi, Cobalti, de Lillo and Schizzerotto.), we re-evaluate their findings and explore why the reforms failed to bring about the expected change.

We find that the liberalization of access to the *maturità* failed to increase the odds of university

attendance by the working class. The new opportunities to matriculate from upper-secondary schools and to continue to university were taken up by increased demand generated by a sharp rise in the number of middle school graduates; the growing demand of girls for education, and an expansion of the upper-middle classes. In addition, when the reforms were put in place, large cohorts were going through the educational system, exerting yet another demand on the system. The reforms also failed because they did not change the symbolic meaning of attending vocational education, they did not adapt the curriculum to the new structure, and they did not address the cultural and economic barriers which determine educational aspirations in the Italian working class.

## I. INTRODUCTION

During the 1960s Italy reformed its educational system in several important respects. First, in 1963, the unified middle school was established and compulsory schooling was extended to age fourteen. Second, in 1961 and again in 1969, access to universities was greatly liberalized by enabling students in all upper-secondary tracks, including the vocational *istituti professionali* -- which are attended primarily by working-class students -- to seat for the maturity examinations and to continue to university. The reforms were expected to reduce class inequality in university attendance by raising the odds that working-class youth would do so. However, previous research (Cobalti and Schizzerotto 1993, 1994) finds little change in class inequality in educational attainment for cohorts who attended school before, during, and after the reforms. In this paper, we reevaluate these findings and explore why the liberalization of university access failed to achieve its egalitarian objective.

The essence of our argument is that the reforms failed to reduce class differences in educational

opportunity because they were badly timed and incomplete. 'Badly timed' because they coincided with rapidly increasing demand for upper-secondary education brought about simultaneously by growing birth cohorts, a growing middle class, increased rates of educational attendance by girls, and a rapid increase in the completion rate of compulsory schooling. The resources of the upper secondary system were probably being used to absorb demand rather than facilitate class equalization. Thus, the reform was not accompanied by change in curricula, teaching methods and financial aid programs. The reform removed formal barriers, but did not address the cultural and economic barriers which determine educational aspirations and possibilities of the working class.

## **II. THE ITALIAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM**

### **II.A The Structure**

Compulsory education in Italy lasts for eight years from age six to fourteen (see figure 1) and is divided into two cycles: a five-year primary education (*scuola elementare*), and lower secondary education (*scuola media*) in grades six to nine. After completing compulsory education (and obtaining the *licenza di scuola media inferiore*), one can proceed to upper-



secondary education (*scuola secondaria superiore*), which, unlike primary and lower secondary education, is divided into different tracks. Four main tracks are distinguished: 1) five-year institutes of general education (the *licei*, either scientific, classical or linguistic); 2) five-year technical institutes (*istituti tecnici*); 3) *Istituti professionali* in which a three year vocational program can be followed by an additional two-year preparation for the *maturità* examinations, and 4) four-year *liceo artistico* and *istituto magistrale*. The classical and scientific *licei* constituted the traditional pre-university programme. Recently, there has been a rapid growth of the technical and vocational institutes which offer a wide range of subjects.

The possession of the *maturità* from any of the five-year upper-secondary schools offers admission to almost any university *facoltà*. The Italian university system leads to the *laurea*, which can be obtained after a minimum of four to six years, depending on the discipline.

## **II.B Attendance and Completion Rates**

Pre-school (*scuola materna*) for children in the ages three to five is now attended by 87 percent of

children in the relevant age group. Currently, the attendance rates at both the primary level (*scuola elementare*) and the lower secondary level (*scuola media*) approach a hundred percent. At age 14 pupils may leave the *scuola media* either with or without their school certificate, and take up work or an apprenticeship, but the majority proceed to upper secondary schools. To obtain the middle school certificate, pupils sit an exam, for which they obtain a grade (from '*sufficiente*' as a minimum for passing, to '*ottimo*' as the maximum). Nearly 95 percent of those seating for the exam pass it and obtain the diploma (*licenza di scuola media*) thus gaining access to any of the different tracks at the upper-secondary level. Track placement depends on the choice of the pupil and parents. However, choice is very much affected by teachers' evaluations of students' capabilities. Pupils leave the *scuola media* with a written teacher's evaluation which might read: "Mario is strongly advised to proceed to an *istituto professionale*". Such strong signals play an important role in shaping 'choices'.

In 1989, about 62 per cent of the age group 14-18 attends upper-secondary education. The proportions



attending the various tracks are (OECD 1985):

<i>Istituto Tecnico</i>	42%
<i>Istituto Professionale and Magistrale</i>	28%
<i>Liceo</i> (various types)	30%

Upper-secondary attendance rates have increased faster for girls than for boys, eliminating gender inequality at this level (see below). However, the sex ratio varies greatly among the different types of upper-secondary education: at the *istituti magistrali* (training colleges for primary school teachers) 93 per cent of the students are female, whereas in the *istituti tecnici* the percentage of women is around 40 per cent. The transition rate from a complete upper-secondary education to university is approximately 68 per cent (Cobalti and Schizzerotto, 1993, p. 158 and see OECD). The university attendance rate in the 19-23 age group is about 15 per cent (Cobalti and Schizzerotto 1993, p. 158). Men are still over-represented at this level, although in certain disciplines they have been outnumbered by women. An important feature of the university system in Italy is that the majority of students who enrol never

graduate, and the majority of those who do, take much longer than the nominal 4 to 6 years.

### **II.C The Reforms of the Sixties**

Until the act of 1962, Italy had a bipartite system of lower secondary education; the *scuola di avviamento professionale* and the *scuola media*. The former was a dead-end school with respect to the main branches of upper secondary education and was intended to facilitate entry into the labor force. In 1962, the *scuola media unica* was introduced. From now on, compulsory education extended to age 14 and was not differentiated by curriculum.

The upper-secondary *licei* have not undergone any major change since 1923. However, the 1961 and 1969 reforms reappraised the technical-vocational sector, and liberalized access to post secondary schooling (OECD 1985, p.30). Until 1961, graduates of the *istituti tecnici* could continue to university in the faculties of economics and commerce. The 1961 reform extended their access to other faculties, most notably to engineering and architecture.

The reform of 1969 liberalized access to university even further. Now graduates from both the *istituti tecnici* and the less prestigious *istituti*

*professionali* could enter universities in virtually all *facoltà*. For example, graduates who had studied tourism in an *istituto professionale* could read political science at the university level (Barbagli 1982). In addition, the reform established a one-year supplementary program enabling students in the *magistrale* track to obtain the *maturità* and continue to university.

These reforms were unusually egalitarian. Although legislated under a Christian Democratic government, they were strongly pushed for by the Italian Communist Party for whom the eradication of class differences in educational access was an important political objective (Barbagli 1982, Ginsborg 1990). Even in the United States, where post-secondary education is very open and non-selective, high-school graduation does not guarantee college admission, especially not into four-year colleges.

Sociologists like to distinguish among educational systems according to their position on a continuum ranging between 'contest-' and 'sponsored-mobility' ideal-types (Turner 1961). In 'contest' type systems students' own choice and motivations determine their educational attainment. In the typical 'contest'-like

system, like that of the American state of Wisconsin, the major determinant of college attendance is not secondary school track but rather students' own aspirations -- a measure of choice (Sewell and Hauser, 1975). By contrast, in 'sponsored mobility'-type systems, students are placed, early-on, on a trajectory which would lead them to a predetermined educational and social destination. The ideal-typical 'sponsored-mobility'-type system is the German where at age 10 students are assigned to either the *Gymnasium*, the *Realschule* or the *Hauptschule* which in turn strongly determine their subsequent educational and occupational careers.

The key factor in distinguishing between the extremes of the continuum is choice. Namely the extent to which at each and every step in the educational sequence, students can still choose among a wide range of options. **In the former type, it is never too late, while in the latter, it is late very early.**

Sociologists of education are critical of tracking because it constrains choice (e.g. Shavit 1990, Oakes 1985). We assume that freedom to choose is synonymous with equality. Sen (1992), for instance, makes this argument very convincingly. In asking 'equality of



what?' he concludes that it most properly should be answered by equality in the capacity to choose among alternatives. Tracking constraints choice and is therefore bad for equality.

The Italian reforms, which liberalized access to university, removed some of the formal barriers to choice in the transition from the upper-secondary level to university. Working class children who tend to attend the vocational tracks, are no longer formally blocked from access to university. We expect therefore, that the reforms would have increased their university attendance rates, thereby equalizing class differences therein.

## **II.D Previous Research**

Against the back drop of these expectations, the findings of previous research on the outcomes of the reforms come as some surprise. Cobalti and Schizzerotto (1993, 1994) analyzed the relationship between educational qualifications of Italian respondents and the class position of their fathers. They also looked for change in the magnitude of this relationship across time, expecting to find a decline in class inequality of education during the 60s and 70s, the post-reform years. Their findings, by

contrast, show very little change.

In their 1993 study, they compared three birth cohorts: those born between 1920 and 1933, those born between 1934 and 1947 and those born between 1948 and 1961. Most members of the last cohort were attending upper secondary school during and after the reforms of the 60s. Between the oldest and youngest cohort there was a distinct improvement in the educational attainments of both men and women. Specifically, regression analysis showed that (a) over time, there has been a general increase in the mean duration of educational attainment; (b) the effects of cultural capital (measured by father's educational attainment on duration of own educational attainment has decreased; (c) the effect of father's occupation on education has increased lightly, and finally, d) the weights of these effects differ by gender: the effect of father's schooling is stronger among men, whereas the effect of father's occupation is greater among women.

In the second part of their 1993 paper, Cobalti and Schizzerotto analyze change in the effects of sex and father's occupational class on the log-odds of various educational transitions. They define three



separate transitions: (a) from primary to lower secondary education, (b) from lower secondary to upper-secondary education, and (c) from upper-secondary to university education. Their results show that: 1) the probability of obtaining any educational level are highest for the bourgeoisie and the middle-class, followed by the urban petite bourgeoisie and the working class, and lowest for the agricultural working class. This hierarchy did not change remarkably between transitions and is stable over time.<sup>2</sup> 2) Inequality between men and women in the odds of completing successive educational levels declined. 3) There was a steady increase in the odds at the first transition point, whereas the third transition point showed a decline in the odds. In other words, the odds of entering the *scuola media* have increased whereas the odds that upper-secondary students would continue to university declined. According to Cobalti and Schizzerotto this is due to the educational reform, which changed the composition of the group attaining this transition point<sup>3</sup>. They also report trendless change over time in social origin effects on

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<sup>2</sup> The one exception is the agricultural petite bourgeoisie whose children have a higher rate of continuation to university than would be expected on the basis of their cultural resources alone.

<sup>3</sup> This group became larger and less socially select.

odds of the various educational transitions.

In their second analysis (Cobalti and Schizzerotto, 1994) they compare three broad cohorts (born in 1920-35, 1936-51 and 1952-67) and rather than model educational transitions, they use log-linear models to study the association between father's class and the highest educational qualification attained. The first two cohorts attended education in the 'rigid and élitist educational system' (p.184), whereas the last cohort attended school under the more open conditions that were provided by the reforms in the 1960's. However, here too they found that **the association between social origin and educational attainment has hardly changed over time.** This sustains their skepticism about the effects of educational reforms which, through the liberalization of access to higher education, mean to reduce the effect of social background on educational attainment.

Studies included in an international comparative project (Shavit and Blossfeld 1993) which included Italy (Cobalti and Schizzerotto 1993), employed this methodology, assessing, among other things, the consequences of educational reforms for equality of educational opportunity. It was found that in none of

the thirteen countries studied did educational reforms lead to more equal educational opportunity. Research should be directed at understanding why class or stratum differences in the odds of matriculating from one educational level to the next do not decline as a result of educational reforms. The alternative is to adopt a fatalistic attitude which accepts inequality of opportunity as given. The Italian reforms were far-reaching and their failure begs analysis.

The remainder of this paper consists of two parts. In the first, we empirically re-evaluate Cobalti and Schizzerotto's conclusions by repeating their analysis but with more detail measurements of social origins, of cohorts, of educational transition points, and using somewhat different models. In the second section, we try to explain the failure of the reforms to equalize educational attainment across social strata. Through-out, we employ the 1985 Mobility Data collected by Barbagli, Capecchi, Cobalti, de Lillo and Schizzerotto which were kindly made available to us by Schizzerotto.

### **III DATA AND VARIABLES**

Sample: The 1985 Mobility Data provides information on a nationally representative sample of 5,016 men and

women in the ages 18-65. For the multivariate analysis we analyze data for a sub-sample born between 1940 and 1965, whereas for the initial descriptive analysis we also employ data for the cohorts born in the 30s. The reforms should have had effects beginning with the cohorts born in the late forties but especially with the cohorts of the early 50s.

Variables: The dependent variables are five dummy variables representing levels of educational attainment. Media is coded 1 for respondents who had completed the *scuola media* (or equivalent) or any higher level of education; Upper-Secondary is coded 1 for those who had entered any upper-secondary school, whether completing it or not. Maturità is coded 1 for those who completed any five-year upper-secondary school or who obtained a university degree. Post-Secondary is coded 1 for all those who had any post-secondary education. Finally, Laurea represents the attainment of a university degree.

The independent variables are: Year of Birth coded as pairs of years: 30-32, 33-34...64-65; Sex is a dummy coded 1 for males; North is a dummy coded 1 for those who, during their teens, lived in the provinces north of Rome; Father's Occupation is the De



Lillo/Schizzerotto (1983) score of father's occupation when Respondent was 14 years old; Farm is a dummy indicating that father was a farmer then and, Father Self-Employed indicates accordingly. Finally, there is Father's Education. In the original survey, respondents were asked to indicate which educational level their fathers had completed. They could choose between seven nominal response categories ranging from 'illiterate' to 'university degree' (plus 'other'). We experimented with various manipulations of this variable and have decided to simply recode it into school-year equivalents as follows: 'illiterate'=0; 'no-qualifications'=5; 'elementary school certificate'=6; 'middle school or vocational school leaving certificate'=9; 'complete secondary education'=12; 'university degree'=17. The proportions of the dummy variables and the means and standard deviations of the continuous variables are presented, by ten-year cohorts in Table 1.

## IV ANALYSIS

### IV.A Post-World War II Educational Expansion

We begin by looking at historical change in the rates of Italian men and women who reached successive levels of education. Figure 2.a presents, for men born in 1930-65, the proportions completing each of the five educational levels. The proportions are computed for pairs of adjacent cohorts because many single-year cohorts in the sample are small yielding estimates which fluctuate erratically.

The curve representing the completion of *scuola media*, shows an increase from about 40 percent to nearly 100 percent. The dip in the curve, for the cohorts born in the mid-thirties, probably reflects the outbreak of World War II which had a disruptive effect on life in general, schooling included. The 1963 reform, which put in place mechanisms with which to enforce the minimum school leaving age of 14, appears to have been effective as is indicated by the stepwise increase in the rate associated with the 1948-51 cohorts, the first to enter middle school under the new law.

Up until the 1958 cohort, the proportion entering upper-secondary school rises in parallel to the



previous curve showing that the upper-secondary schools have admitted a growing proportion of the eligible *licenziati*. However, for the last few cohorts, the proportion entering upper-secondary schools declines continuously from about 0.80 to under 0.65. This decline carries over to the remaining graphs in the figure: the proportion obtaining the *maturità* and the proportion entering post-secondary education increase until the 1958 cohort and then decline. The down-turn in the proportion graduating from universities begins earlier with the cohort born in 1952.

The patterns for women are somewhat different: for their pre-war cohorts, the curves are quite flat showing stability in the low rates of women's educational attainment. However, beginning with the cohorts of the early 1940s, the curves take an upward turn till the cohorts of the late 50s and early 60s where they flatten out.

#### **IV.A.1 A Digression on the Declining Rates of Attainment.**

We conclude that for cohorts born since the WWII -- earlier for men than for women -- and through the cohorts of the late 50s, educational attainment at all

levels increased. The subsequent stagnation (for women) and decline (for men) in the rates is puzzling, and methodologically worrisome: it may be due to sample selection bias among the young cohorts. The cohorts showing decline would have been in their twenties at the time of the survey. The more educated among them would have been more likely than the less educated to still be enrolled in university, leading student life, some moving between student flats, others abroad on exchange programs, etc.. In short, among the young cohorts, the more educated are probably less easily found by survey workers. Thus, among the young cohorts, the sample may be biased against educated persons and this may explain the declining rate or rates of increases in the curves. If the sample is biased among young cohorts, we should avoid using the younger cohorts in the remainder of the analysis.

We evaluate bias by comparing our cohort proportions completing upper-secondary school to those reported by the Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT 1986). The Istat Sommario di Statistiche Storiche (1926-1985) presents, for each year between '26 and '85, the number of graduates, from each of the various

upper secondary school tracks. By summing across tracks, we obtain the total number of graduates per year. This number was then divided by the number born in Italy 19 years earlier (obtained from table 2.12 in the *Sommario*) to produce rough estimates of the cohort proportions graduating.<sup>4</sup>

Figure 2c graphs the proportion of successive cohorts who completed upper secondary education. The important conclusion is that the patterns correspond quite closely with the patterns reported on the basis of the 1985 mobility data, except that the latter seems to over-report the proportions somewhat. This difference is not surprising because the mobility estimates are based on respondents' self-reported achievements, which tend to be exaggerated. We are comforted that the shape of the curves based on the two sources are similar, including the decline beginning with the cohorts of the late fifties.

We can only speculate as to the reasons for the decline. One possibility is that the successive

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<sup>4</sup> The estimates are probably somewhat biased by immigration and emigration between year of birth and graduation and by the Italian practice of leaving students behind. It is said that about half of all students have been left behind at least one year in their educational career. Thus, the number of graduates in any given year includes many who are older than 19. We assume however, that this is cancelled out by the number of cohort members who will graduate with younger cohorts. We also assume that during the period under study, emigration exceeded immigration. Thus, our estimates are probably downwardly biased.

cohorts of the late 50s and early 60s were ever larger following a demographic trough (see Figure 2d). Growing cohorts face institutional squeezes: they suffer from declining teacher/student ratios and increasing student density in classes. Ironically, the squeeze may have been exacerbated by the success of the 1963 reform which increased the cohort proportions reaching upper secondary schools. In addition, the same cohorts were also the ones in which the educational participation rates of girls increased. Thus, the birth cohorts of the late 50s suffered a compounded institutional squeeze. We shall return to this point in the conclusion.

#### **IV.B Change in the Process of Educational Attainment**

We now proceed to formally test the hypothesis that the reforms of the 1960s changed socio-economic inequalities in education. We conduct the analysis within the framework of logit models of educational attainment (Mare 1981) which have become standard in studies of educational stratification (e.g. Smith and Cheung 1986, Shavit and Blossfeld 1993). The models enable the researcher to decompose the overall effect of students' social origins, gender and other characteristics on their educational attainment into



components corresponding to each stage of the process. In addition, the models have been employed to look at historical change in the effects of social origins at each step of the attainment process. For example, Raftery and Hout (1993), Shavit and Kraus (1990) and Gerber and Hout (1994) have shown for Ireland, Israel, and Russia respectively, that whereas social selection into the lower levels of schooling became more equal over time, selection into tertiary education did not, and that the effects of social origins on the latter even increased in some cases.

We begin by estimating unconditional logit models for each of the five educational levels represented by the dependent dummy variables. Unconditional logit models estimate the effects of the independent variables on the (log) odds that a person will reach an educational level (e.g. enter upper secondary school). Conditional logit models do the same thing but exclude from each model those respondents who had not completed the previous educational level (e.g. when estimating the model for entry into upper-secondary school, they would exclude all those who had not completed middle school). We employ unconditional models to estimate change in the overall odds of

reaching the various educational levels and then use conditional models to try and pinpoint at which educational transition point has change occurred. For example, the unconditional analysis will show that gender differences in the odds of attaining most levels of education declined. However, the conditional model will show that the decline is due to gender equalization at two specific points: at entering upper secondary education and then in the transition from a *maturità* to post-secondary education.

#### **IV.B.1 Unconditional Models of Educational Attainment**

Each model includes all the independent variables listed earlier. We also tested for interactions between these variables and cohort. Specifically, we allowed the effects of each independent variable to vary by ten year cohorts. The formal test for the effect of the reforms on equality of educational opportunity would be a comparison of the effects of socio-economic origins on the cohorts of the 40s to their effects on the cohorts of the 50s and 60s. The parameter estimates of the best-fitting model for each educational transition are presented in Table 3. The equations for the first four levels of schooling are estimated for the 1940-65 cohorts. However, the models



for *laurea* exclude those born after 1959 because many respondents belonging to these younger cohorts (age 25 or less at the time of interview) would not have graduated yet.

The results shown in Table 3 are summarized as follows:

1. The effects of gender on the odds of completing *scuola media*, entering upper-secondary school, obtaining the *maturità*, and entering post-secondary education, changed significantly across the cohorts. In the two early cohorts, men enjoyed a significant advantage over women in the odds of reaching each of these levels of schooling, but by the youngest cohorts their advantage disappears. The equation for university degree, which excludes the cohorts of the sixties, does not show a decline in the advantage of men.
2. The effects of having been raised in the north of Italy on the odds of completing the *scuola media* also varied across cohorts. Controlling for the other variables in the model, the effect of North on *scuola media* completion is positive (1.014) and significantly larger than it was for the older cohorts (1.014-0.783 and 1.014-0.554). On the other hand, the net effect of

North on attendance of post secondary education and the obtaining of a university degree is negative. The initial Southern disadvantage is probably due to the less developed educational system there and to unmeasured mean socioeconomic handicaps suffered by southerners. However, once a Southerner has completed the *media*, his or her incentive to pursue higher education is greater than in the North. Historically, unemployment has been higher in the South and public sector employment was considered an attractive prospect. Higher education helps getting into the government bureaucracy, and probably helps getting promoted within it. Thus, Southerners are more motivated than otherwise similar Northerners to obtain a university education.

3. The effect of father's occupation on entry into post-secondary education declined significantly between the cohorts of the 40s and the 50s. For the former, it is 0.026 (adding the main effect of father's occupation and the effect of its interaction with the 1940-49 cohort) while for the cohorts of the 1950s and 60s it is not significantly different from zero. The effect of the interaction between father's occupation and cohort is also marginally significant

on the odds of university graduation showing a halving of the effect between the cohorts of the 40s and 50s.

In and of themselves, the linear effects of social-origin variables on the log odds of educational attainment are not a satisfactory operationalization of 'inequality of educational attainment' between social origins groups. The problem has been discussed extensively by others (e.g. Mare 1981, Hout, Raftery and Bell 1993, Smith and Cheung 1986).<sup>5</sup>

To facilitate interpretation of the results, we transform the coefficients of models 1-5 into the probability scale. For each cohort, we compute the predicted probabilities of completing *scuola media*, entering upper-secondary school, obtaining the *maturità*, entering post-secondary education, and obtaining the *laurea* (Figures 3a-3e). These are computed for three types of social origins representing three social classes: the professional service class, petite bourgeoisie, and unskilled workers. The three types are sons to: 'journalists',

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<sup>5</sup> The difficulty derives from the non-linear relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable when conceptualized on the probability scale. A given logit difference between any two social groups (e.g. men and women) can translate into either large or small probability differences between them. Differences in the probabilities between two groups are a function not just of the logit effect of the group variable, but also of the intercepts, namely of the overall success rate (i.e. the proportion attaining the educational level under study). The effect of the group variable may be stable across cohorts, suggesting stable group inequality in the logit, but group differences in the probability scale may change drastically due to variations in the overall success rate.

'proprietors of maintenance firms' or 'unskilled workers'.<sup>6</sup>

Figure 3a shows that the three class probabilities of completing *scuola media* converged between the cohorts of the 40s and those of the 60s. The rank ordering of the three 'classes' did not change and we recall from Table 3 that the socioeconomic strata differences in the log-odds did not change, but the probabilities did converge as compulsory education was effectively extended to age fourteen and all classes were pushed up towards universal completion. In other words, the convergence is due to increases in the overall level of *media* completion. Figure 3b, which displays the predicted probabilities of entering upper-secondary school also shows a slight convergence extending through the cohorts of the late 50s, which is followed by **increased inequality** as the curves of the lower classes turn downwards.

The predicted probabilities of obtaining the *maturità* also show a mixed pattern. They converged, especially between the cohorts born in 1950 and 1956.

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<sup>6</sup> 'Journalist' are represented by a father's occupational score of 80.71 (De Lillo and Schizzerotto 1983), an imputed father's education of 13 years, and zeros for Farm and Father Self-Employed. The second type is represented by an occupational score of 57.51, an education of 7 years, a 0 for Farm and a 1 for Father Self-Employed. The last category is represented by an occupational score of 20, an education of 4 and zeros for the other two variables. All three are defined for Southern males.



Subsequently, with the decline in *maturità* rates, the class inequality increased. Figure 3d shows that the probabilities of entering post-secondary education increased, and then declined, in parallel fashion for the three classes. Turning finally to Figure 3e, we see that the probabilities that sons of the professional class will graduate from university declined sharply for the cohorts born in the late 40s and early 50s. The decline also affected the proprietary class thus equalizing class differences downwards.

In sum, Figures 3a-e suggest that the creation, in 1963, of the *scuola media unica* and the extension of effective compulsory education to age fourteen, equalized class differences in middle school completion. As larger proportions of the working class completed the *media*, there was also an increase in its proportion entering and graduating from upper-secondary schools. This trend of convergence seems to have been interrupted by the declines in the overall rates of upper-secondary entry and its completion for the cohorts born since the late 50s. We also saw a decline in university graduation rates which affected the privileged classes most.

The unconditional analysis of educational attainment does not enable us to draw firm conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the reforms liberalizing access to university because the probabilities of entry into and completion of higher educational levels confound processes affecting probabilities at all lower levels. For example, the convergence in the class rates of entry into upper-secondary school confounds the convergence at the previous level with patterns of transition probabilities from the *media* to the upper-secondary level. Conditional models of educational transitions are used to disentangle these cumulative effects.

#### **IV.B.2 A Closer Look: Models of Educational Transitions.**

Table 4 presents estimates of the conditional educational transition models. We define four transitions: from *media* completion to entry into upper-secondary school; from upper-secondary school entry to obtaining a *maturità*; from the latter to post-secondary school attendance, and from *maturità* to the completion of a *laurea*. We do not estimate a new (conditional) model for the completion of *scuola media* and refer the reader to model 1 in the Table 3 which

models the transition from no education to that level.

Recall that gender inequality in the odds of *media* completion declined, and that the absolute cohort proportions and number of *media* graduates increased rapidly during the years we are studying. As the pool of *media* graduates grew to include virtually the whole cohort, it also became less distinct socio-economically (see Table 5). For example, the mean level of father's education for all respondents born in the 1940s was 6.12 with a standard deviation of 3.0, whereas among *media* graduates born in that decade, the mean was 7.5 - about 2/3 of a standard deviation higher than the cohort as a whole. By contrast, among those born in the 60s, the two means are approximately the same.

As a consequence of the heterogenization of the pool of *media* graduates relative to the complete cohorts, the effects of social origins on their transition to upper-secondary school **increased** over time. In other words, as *scuola media* completion became common place, socio-economic selection shifted to the subsequent level in the educational hierarchy. This is seen in the first column of Table 4 where the effects of the interactions between cohorts and both

father's education and farm origins increase significantly.

As a result, the entrants into the upper-secondary level remained an equally select subset of the pool of *media* graduates. For example, in the cohort of the 40s, the mean father's education among upper-secondary school entrants was about 0.6 higher than that computed among *media* graduates (Table 5). The same difference was maintained for the cohorts of the 50s and 60s. In other words, the increased SES selectivity in the *media* to upper-secondary transition, meant that the upper-secondary pool of students maintained its relative selectivity on social origins through-out the period. In consequence, schools were not compelled to change processes related to socioeconomic selection. Indeed, as indicated in model 2 of Table 4, there was no change across cohorts in the effects of social origins. By contrast, gender differences in these odds were eliminated as is indicated by interaction terms involving sex. In addition, there was no change in the effects of either sex, region or SES origins on the odds of post-secondary education and of obtaining the *laurea*. In light of our main research question, the most important result is that there was no change in



the effects of socioeconomic origins past entry into *scuola secondaria superiore*.

Again, to facilitate interpretation, we present the results on the probability scale (Figures 4a-d) beginning with the transition from *media* to the upper-secondary level (Figure 4a). The proportion of *media* graduates from professional class origins who continued to the upper-secondary level has been at nearly 100 percent through-out the period and could not increase much further. The transition rate for the other two classes did increase, and the proportionate increase was most pronounced for the working class until the cohorts of the mid fifties when it declined. **Thus, although the effects of fathers' education and farm origins on the log odds increased, the overall increase in the odds reduced class inequality in the probability of making this transition.**

Turning to the next transition (Figure 4b), we see that the three curves fluctuate within a small range and in parallel fashion. Only for one cohort, those born in 1958-59, do we see what might have been the beginning of a convergence. If it was, it was quickly aborted by the down turn of the curves which again increased class inequality in the transition

probabilities. The remaining two figures show no change in the transition probabilities from *maturità* completion to post-secondary education and to the *laurea* diploma.

#### IV.B.3 Interim Summary and Interpretation

The increases in the *maturità* rates, which we have seen in Figures 2.a, 2.b and Table 3, are due primarily to the growing rates of *scuola media* completion brought about by the 1963 reform of the compulsory schooling law. Some of the increase is also due to the greater participation of girls in the educational process. As Table 6 shows, there was also upgrading of the students' social origins across cohorts as the farming class declined and the service class increased. This changing class composition of the cohorts contributed to the increased demand for education. However, net of these factors, neither the odds nor the probability that an upper secondary school student would obtain the *maturità* change very much subsequent to the reforms which liberalized access to the *maturità* and to higher education. **The upper-secondary system simply caught up with increased demand but did not contribute to further increases in *maturità* or post-secondary education of the various classes and social groups. Nor has there been change in the socio-economic selection within the upper-secondary level and beyond.**

The pattern of change in class inequality at the

lower educational levels is consistent with the story told by Raftery and Hout's (1993) MMI (Maximally Maintained Inequality) hypothesis: middle class students (and their parents) are more motivated and better able to take advantage of opening educational opportunities. When opportunities open up, the upper-middle classes would be first to take advantage of them. Only when their demand has been met, would the lower classes be able to avail themselves of additional vacancies in the educational system. In other words, equalization of educational attainment at any given level of schooling can only be achieved by expanding that level towards universal attendance rates. This was achieved at the *media* level. Once the upper classes achieved universal attendance at that level, expansion of the system brought up the rates of the lower class and contributed to greater class equality. By the same logic, when the rates of entering upper-secondary school, declined the gaps increased again. It should be stressed that the major contribution to equalization was not made by changes in the educational selection process (i.e. by changes in the class differences in the odds of the educational transitions). Rather, it was the increase



in the overall level of *media* completion that pushed all classes towards the ceiling of universal attendance.

The irony is that the trend towards equalization which we have seen in Figures 3b, 4a and 4b were aborted by the declining educational participation rates which may have been brought about by the success of 1963 reform which delivered so many (too many?) students to the gates of upper secondary education.

Finally, there was no equalization in the class proportions attaining the higher educational levels, because at these levels there has been only a small change in the overall transition rates.

#### **V. But Why?**

The MMI hypothesis provides a consistent macro-level interpretation of our findings. And yet, at the micro-level, we are still perplexed: why did working class students not take advantage of the new opportunities created by the reform, obtain the *maturità* and continue to university in larger numbers? Indeed OECD statistics on the proportion of upper-secondary school students in the various tracks who complete a five-year course of study (OECD 1985: p. 32) show the following: of *liceo* students, about 80

percent complete a five year course of study and obtain the *maturità* while in the *istituti tecnici* the proportion is 68 percent. By contrast, in the *istituti professionali* the proportion is only 32 percent. Furthermore, analysing data from the 1985 Mobility study for cohorts born between 1962-1964<sup>7</sup> we find that the proportion of *maturi* who continue to university varies greatly by the track they had attended. Of *liceo* graduates, 89 percent proceed to university as compared with 42 and 29 percent from the technical and professional institutes. Thus, the proportion of students who enter the *istituti professionali* who then continue to university is very small (less than 10 percent). Evidently, the large majority of these students do not take advantage of the opportunities which the reform of 1969 seems to have created for them. No wonder that we fail to find effects of the reform on the rate of university attendance, graduation and on class inequalities therein.

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<sup>7</sup>. Respondents to the Mobility Survey questionnaire were asked to specify what was the highest qualification they had obtained. They were also asked if they were currently pursuing an educational qualification and, if so, what qualification they were pursuing. Moreover, they were asked if they had pursued additional qualification but discontinued their studies. Respondents born in 1962-64 were 21-23 years old at the time of interview. Only 2 of them (out of 431) completed the *laurea* by then. We assume however, that most of those who would ever do so, would have already been enrolled in university. Thus, for these few respondents we have information on the type of upper-secondary track they had completed and on whether or not they ever enrolled in university.

## V.A BRIEF VISITS TO SCHOOLS

We now must ask why students in the vocational institutes do not take advantage of their opportunity to matriculate and obtain university degrees. In pursuit of an answer we visited two professional institutes, and one technical institute and interviewed their vice-presidents and several other staff members. We asked them to speak to us about various aspects pertaining to the students and their choices. Specifically, we tried to understand why so few of the students in the *istituti professionali* obtain the *maturità* and why do so few *maturi* proceed to university. Clearly, we can rely on such sketchy data for answers but they do suggest hypotheses for future research. Three hypotheses are suggested.

### 1: The structure of the curriculum in the *istituti professionali*

When visiting two vocational institutes in Florence, it seemed likely that the very structure of this type of education enhances high drop-out rates. The curriculum during the first three years stresses the practical aspects of instruction. This cycle ends with an exam which gives students who pass it the

*qualifica*, a qualification that until recently was highly regarded in the labor market and opened job opportunities. Thus the *qualifica* is a 'natural' point to end one's formal education. The theoretical material and 'general culture' are taught primarily in the last two years of the *istituto professionale*, leading to the *maturità*. This means that the character of the curriculum differs significantly between the two cycles, and this is seen as a large obstacle by many students<sup>8</sup>. In addition, during the first two years of the *istituti professionali* it is very common to make students re-sit one or more years. This has a demotivating effect and many students prefer to drop-out rather than lose a year.

## 2: The students and teachers

Social origin is an important determinant of choice of a track after *scuola media*. Children from lower social backgrounds are disproportionately found in vocational and technical institutes and are less likely to be

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<sup>8</sup>Recently, many professional institutes are taking part in the so-called 'progetto 92', which is an initiative of the professional institutes to offer a complete and coherent five-year course, leading to the *maturità*. There is more 'basic culture, professional culture and work-related experience' in all five years. Even though the division between a three- and a two-year cycle still exists, this new structure should stimulate students to finish the full five years, and not quit after the *qualifica*. Until now this reform seems to have the intended effect, but it will still take time to see whether this structural reform will significantly enhance the *maturità* completion rates among the *istituti professionali* students. The new structure is also a response to the labour market, which demands more and more *diplomati* (those who have completed a *maturità*) instead of *qualificati*.



found in the *licei*<sup>9</sup>. From the interviews with vice-presidents of *istituti professionali*, we got the impression that the teachers at these institutes think that working class students would want to obtain a vocation rather than continue to university. They also believe that students capable enough for higher education would have already been identified at the *media* level, and would have been advised to attend a *liceo*. Thus, the vice presidents do not feel that they should encourage their students to take advantage of the possibility to pursue a university education. These expectations are probably reflected in the teachers' attitudes towards students which would cool-out any expectations that students may have had, or might have developed, for further education. One of the vice-presidents we interviewed (at a vocational institute for fashion and graphics) values 'fantasy' and 'creativity' in her students, rather than academic excellence, and was proud of those who were now

<sup>9</sup> Employing data for the 1962-64 cohorts of the Mobility Survey (see footnote 7) we compute some indicators of track differences in the mean socioeconomic characteristics of their students.

Social Origin	Liceo	Istit Tecnico	Istit Prof	Other
Father's Occupational Score	55.0	42.0	40.3	31.6
% of Mothers with less than elementary education	3.1	9.1	10.9	25.9
% of Fathers Laureati	24.6	2.5	2.5	1.4

employed by Christian Dior and Ferragamo rather than those in university. The teachers at these institutes seem to think that it is rather the role of the various *licei* to prepare students for university. In addition, many teachers at professional institutes come from such institutes themselves, and have had little contact with the world of the university. Thus, it would seem that the teachers have not internalized their new calling and still view their role in light of the previous charter of the vocational schools (i.e. to train skilled workers rather than university bound students).

### 3: Rational choice and economic constraints

Sixty four per cent of all students enrolling in Italian universities will never finish their degree. There are few loans available for university students. Thus, only those who feel they have a fair chance of finishing their degree would make the effort to try. The prospect of high foregone earnings coupled with the low probability of completion inhibit working-class adolescents from ever trying. This may be especially true for those who had obtained vocational qualifications and have an occupational alternative to further education.

## VI SUMMARY

It would seem that the 1969 reform failed to equalize class differences in odds of *maturità* and university attendance because it was badly timed and because it did not go far enough. 'Badly timed' because during the 80s there was a tidal wave of demand for upper-secondary education. The demand was generated by growing birth cohorts, by the growing middle class - an educational-hungry class -, by the increase in girls' rates of educational attendance at all levels, and by the increase in the proportions of cohorts who were completing compulsory schooling. The resources of the upper secondary system were probably being used to absorb demand rather than facilitate class equalization. We would imagine that during those years the educational institutions were concerned with building schools and training teachers with a view towards meeting demand. They were less concerned with innovations which might have enhanced the educational achievements and attainment of working class students. Thus, the reform was not accompanied by change in curricula, teaching methods and financial aid programs which might have made it more effective. The reform removed formal barriers, but did not change the

perceived mandate of vocational education, nor did it address the cultural and economic barriers which determine educational aspirations and possibilities of the Italian working class.

Furthermore, the reform coincided with the arrival of the tidal wave at the gates of the universities. Under the free admissions policies, the universities could not control the size of their student body population. What resulted was the famous over-crowding and the falling completion rates. With falling completion rates, the desirability of the university for working class youth declined. We suspect that this would have had a strong cooling-out effect on the aspirations of many adolescents who might otherwise have continued to university.



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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables by Cohort.

	Year of Birth		
	1940-49	1950-59	1960-65
	Proportions		
Sex (Males)	0.48	0.50	0.51
North	0.62	0.60	0.65
Farm	0.18	0.15	0.08
Father Self-Employed	0.20	0.19	0.22
Completed <i>media</i>	0.55	0.79	0.92
Attended Upper-Sec School	0.34	0.59	0.69
Obtained <i>maturità</i>	0.22	0.39	0.42
Attend Post-Secondary Education	0.17	0.26	0.30
Obtain <i>laurea</i>	0.09	0.11	- <sup>a</sup>
	Means and S.D.'s		
Father's Occupational Score	34.38 (17.37)	35.32 (18.19)	38.82 (19.34)
Father's Education	6.12 (3.02)	6.82 (3.38)	7.71 (3.44)

<sup>a</sup> Most members of the cohort were too young in 1985 to have completed their *laurea*.



Table 3: Unconditional Logit Models of Educational Qualifications.

	Scuola Media (1)	Enter Upper- Secondary (2)	Obtain Maturità (3)	Attend Post- Second. (4)	University Degree (5)	(6)
Intercept	-3.428** (0.290)	-4.687** (0.297)	-4.823** (0.315)	-5.246** (0.419)	-5.959** (0.563)	-5.453** (0.462)
Sex	-0.089 (0.292)	-0.110 (0.180)	-0.051 (0.170)	-0.346 (0.183)	0.428* (0.183)	0.409* (0.182)
North	1.014** (0.299)	0.125 (0.097)	-0.125 (0.100)	-0.522** (0.110)	-0.658** (0.185)	-0.672** (0.185)
F's Occ.	0.041** (0.005)	0.031** (0.004)	0.022** (0.003)	0.010 (0.005)	0.016* (0.008)	0.024** (0.006)
Farm	-0.578** (0.162)	-0.563** (0.145)	-0.297 (0.157)	-0.105 (0.177)	-0.052 (0.289)	-0.085 (0.287)
F Self-Emp	-0.176 (0.187)	-0.025 (0.149)	0.017 (0.133)	0.169 (0.139)	0.227 (0.222)	0.191 (0.222)
F's Educ.	0.272** (0.030)	0.350** (0.030)	0.277** (0.024)	0.306** (0.025)	0.236** (0.034)	0.232** (0.034)
Year of Birth:						
1942-43	0.364 (0.244)	0.550* (0.270)	0.349 (0.315)	0.442 (0.350)	0.395 (0.485)	0.389 (0.475)
1944-45	0.240 (0.259)	0.474 (0.290)	0.584 (0.325)	0.477 (0.369)	0.943* (0.472)	0.907* (0.460)
1946-47	0.117 (0.231)	0.650* (0.256)	0.746* (0.292)	0.702* (0.330)	0.591 (0.451)	0.574 (0.440)
1948-49	1.003** (0.241)	1.169** (0.256)	0.832** (0.293)	0.661* (0.332)	0.863 (0.443)	0.832 (0.433)
1950-51	1.247** (0.320)	1.234** (0.291)	0.973** (0.334)	1.281* (0.500)	1.910** (0.627)	1.123** (0.428)
1952-53	1.157** (0.313)	1.516** (0.288)	1.260** (0.326)	1.281** (0.493)	1.603* (0.630)	0.811 (0.431)
1954-55	1.493** (0.317)	1.716** (0.289)	1.478** (0.322)	1.366** (0.488)	1.433* (0.640)	0.634 (0.443)
1956-57	1.693** (0.309)	1.804** (0.279)	1.518** (0.315)	1.884** (0.473)	1.529* (0.629)	0.741 (0.432)
1958-59	2.770** (0.363)	1.965** (0.283)	1.945** (0.313)	1.673** (0.482)		
1960-61	2.900** (0.402)	2.353** (0.285)	1.878** (0.309)	2.264** (0.477)		
1962-63	2.252** (0.381)	2.052** (0.287)	1.717** (0.312)	1.894** (0.486)		
1964-65	2.520** (0.387)	1.916** (0.283)	1.373** (0.312)	1.670** (0.489)		
Interactions:						
Sex x	0.884**	0.805**	0.996**	1.021**		
1940-49	(0.331)	(0.245)	(0.253)	(0.279)		
Sex x	0.627	0.565*	0.777**	0.664**		
1950-59	(0.344)	(0.235)	(0.229)	(0.249)		
North x	-0.783*					
1940-49	(0.340)					
North x	-0.554					
1950-59	(0.349)					
Father's Occ.				0.016*	0.016#	
x 1940-49				(0.007)	(0.009)	
Father's Occ.				0.007		
x 1950-59				(0.006)		

\* significant at the 0.05 level; \*\* significant at 0.01 level;  
# significant at the 0.07 level

Table 4: Conditional Logit Models of Educational Qualifications.

	Enter Upper- Secondary	Obtain Maturità	Attend Post- Second.	University Degree
Intercept	-2.058** (0.421)	-1.844** (0.407)	-0.694 (0.500)	-2.253** (0.571)
Sex	0.172 (0.113)	0.007 (0.189)	0.048 (0.153)	-0.137 (0.214)
North	-0.182 (0.119)	-0.296* (0.125)	-0.751** (0.163)	-0.556** (0.213)
Father's Occ.	0.022** (0.005)	0.010* (0.004)	0.002 (0.006)	0.017* (0.008)
Farm	-1.060** (0.321)	0.176 (0.209)	0.338 (0.277)	0.030 (0.343)
Father Self-Emp	0.049 (0.173)	0.008 (0.153)	0.065 (0.191)	0.247 (0.250)
Father's Educ.	0.443** (0.068)	0.176** (0.028)	0.205** (0.035)	0.102** (0.039)
Year of Birth:				
1942-43	0.431 (0.332)	-0.013 (0.410)	0.373 (0.579)	0.285 (0.579)
1944-45	0.466 (0.361)	0.396 (0.448)	0.217 (0.599)	0.666 (0.563)
1946-47	0.862** (0.333)	0.505 (0.398)	0.435 (0.529)	0.294 (0.520)
1948-49	0.801* (0.311)	0.129 (0.381)	-0.185 (0.518)	0.478 (0.523)
1950-51	0.517 (0.529)	0.221 (0.435)	0.167 (0.527)	0.970 (0.522)
1952-53	0.950 (0.543)	0.435 (0.420)	-0.140 (0.498)	0.416 (0.502)
1954-55	1.057* (0.536)	0.611 (0.419)	-0.457 (0.496)	-0.180 (0.518)
1956-57	1.032* (0.521)	0.602 (0.409)	0.370 (0.497)	-0.016 (0.508)
1958-59	0.782 (0.518)	1.091** (0.416)	-0.205 (0.474)	
1960-61	-0.229 (0.598)	0.709 (0.396)	0.005 (0.475)	
1962-63	-0.436 (0.605)	0.685 (0.401)	-0.432 (0.473)	
1964-65	-0.702 (0.609)	0.382 (0.396)	-0.298 (0.483)	
Interactions:				
Sex x 1940-49		0.839** (0.308)		
Sex x 1950-59		0.714** (0.269)		
Farm x 1940-49	0.994* (0.425)			
Farm x 1950-59	0.516 (0.391)			
Father's Ed. x 1940-49	-0.220* (0.083)			
Father's Ed. x 1950-59	-0.199* (0.080)			

\* significant at the 0.05 level; \*\* significant at 0.01 level;


**Table 5: The Changing Means (and Standard Deviations) of Fathers' Education Across Risk-Sets and Cohorts**

Risk-Set	Birth Cohort		
	1940-49	1950-59	1960-65
All	6.12 (3.02)	6.82 (3.38)	7.71 (3.44)
Media Graduates	7.13 (3.16)	7.34 (3.43)	7.95 (3.42)
Upper-Sec. Entrants	7.79 (3.35)	7.93 (3.63)	8.58 (3.43)

**Table 6: The Changing Class Composition of the cohorts (column percentages)**

Father's Class <sup>a</sup>	Birth Cohort		
	1940-49	1950-59	1960-65
Service Class	10.7	12.4	18.4
Unskilled White Collar	6.1	6.3	5.5
Petite Bourgeoisie	21.4	18.5	21.6
Skilled Manual	19.1	23.1	25.0
Unskilled Manual	21.5	23.4	21.0
Farmers	21.2	16.4	8.5

<sup>a</sup> The classes correspond to Erikson and Goldthorpe's (1992) classes: I+II, IIIab, IVab, V+VI, VIIa and IVc+VIIb respectively.



Age

Years of  
Schooling

Figure 1 The Italian Education System

Source: Cobalti and Schizzerotto 1993: P. 157



**Fig 2a: Proportion Reaching Educational Levels by Year of Birth: Men**







Fig 2b: Proportion Reaching Educational Levels by Year of Birth: Women



**Fig 2c: Cohorts Proportions Completing Upper-Secondary Education: ISTAT Data**




**Fig 2d: Number of Births (in 1000s)  
by Year: ISTAT Data.**






**Fig 3a: Predicted Probabilities of Media Completion by Class.**




- ▼ Journalists
- Proprietors of Maintenance Firm
- × Unskilled Workers

**Fig 3b: Predicted Probabilities of Entering Upper-Sec by Class.**




**Fig 3c: Predicted Probabilities of Obtaining Maturità by Class.**




- ▼ Journalists
- Proprietors of Maintenance Firm
- ✕ Unskilled Workers

**Fig 3d: Predicted Probabilities of Entering Post-Sec Ed by Class.**






**Fig 3e: Predicted Probabilities of Obtaining the Laurea by Class.**




- ▼ Journalists
- Proprietors of Maintenance Firm
- ✕ Unskilled Workers

**Fig 4a: Predicted Transition Probs.:  
Media to Upper-Sec, by Class**




**Fig 4b: Predicted Transition Probs.:  
Upper-Sec Entry to Maturità, by Class**



- Journalists
- Proprietors of Maintenance Firms
- ✕ Unskilled Workers


**Fig 4c: Predicted Transition Probs.:  
Maturità to Post-Sec, by Class**



- Journalists
- Proprietors of Maintenance Firms
- ✕ Unskilled Workers



**Fig 4d: Predicted Transition Probs.:  
Maturità to Laurea, by Class**







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